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NOTE
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE STATES: T1E
DOCTRINE AND SOME OF ITS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
"The rights of a citizen remain the same whether they collide
with an individual or the government, and judicial tribunals
were wisely established to correct such matters without the
individual being relegated to the position of no other remedy
-'
except to appeal to a legislature.
The principle that the State cannot be sued by its citizens without its consent is well established in the United States, and immunity from suit has been extended to both the federal and state
governments. In the nineteenth century, the citizen rarely came in
contact with his government, and as a result the doctrine of governmental immtnity received judicial adoption in this country almost
without question. But the tremendous growth of government in the
last half century has increased the likelihood of governmental infringement of personal rights. Thus it was inevitable that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would be considerably modified, and its
application limited.
It is beyond the scope of this Note to cover all aspects of
sovereign immunity Much has been written concerning the immunity of federal officers, and attempts have been made to analyze
the decisions of the Supreme Court. 2 In addition, analysis has been

made of the immunity of sub-state levels of government." Nor will
there be an attempt made to traverse the huge field of governmental
liability for torts of officers. The purpose of this Note is to examine
the extent of modification of the immunity doctrine as evidenced
by recent decisions involving the immunity of the states, their officers, and agencies, primarily in areas other than that of financial
tort liability The perspective needed for proper analysis of the
decisions is obtained by a statement of the historical basis of
sovereign immunity, as well as a summary of pertinent statutory
provisions.
1. Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 126 Colo. 438, 441, 250
P 2d 1007, 1008 (1952).
2. See Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1946), Davis, Sovereign Iminunity In Suits Against Officers For Relief Other Than Damages, 40
Cornell L. Q. 3 (1954), Note, Sovereign Immunity and Specific Relief
Against Federal Officers, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 73 (1955).
3. See David, Municipal Liability for Tortious Acts and Omissions
12-71 (1936) , Kneier, The Legal Nature and Statcs of the American Countv,
14 Minn. L. Rev. 141, 147-56 (1930), Comment, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 914,
918-930 (1953).
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PART I.

HISTORICAL BASIS OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

The-origins of sovereign immunity from suit are found in the
medieval concept of the divine right of kings, which in England
was expressed in the ancient maxim, "The King can do no wrong."'
By,the time of Blackstone, personification of sovereignty in the
King had become so axiomatic that Blackstone could write, "The
king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of
thinking wrong.... ."5 Blackstone &xplained the maxim, however,

on the more practical ground of the impossibility of enforcing a
judgment against the King.6 Blackstone implies that since there
was no remedy against the King, it would be uinjust that the King
could commit a wrong, and as a result the law will not impute a
wrong where there is no remedy.
Although notions of monarchy are inconsistent with our form
of government, the English colonists had accepted as axiomatic the
principle that the states were immune from legal action by their
citizens. While the Constitution was before the states for ratification, objection was made that the clause providing that the judicial
power of the United States should extend to controversies "between a State and citizens of another State," 7 would subject the
states to suit by their creditors. 8 This was considered particularly
obnoxious in view of the debts of the states to British subjects,
which the states had no intention of paying." That the clause would
authorize suits by citizens against the states was vigorously denied
by Hamilton,'0 Marshall," and Madison, " Hamilton declaring, "It
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS CONSENT."' 3
Despite the assurances of Hamilton, the United States Supreme
Court at its first opportunity held that a state could be sued by a
4. See Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley. 217 "inn. 218, 230, 14 N. W.

2d 400, 408 (1944) ; Borchard, Govemminet Liability Its Tort, 34 Yale L. J.
1, 2 (1924). See also Barry, The King. Cas Do No Wrong, 11 Va. L. Rev.
349, 353-355 (1925) and note 22 infra.
5. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *246.
6. "Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king
because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies
superiority of power: authority to try would be vain and idle, without an
authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contemptible, unshall
less the court had power to'command the execution of it; but who
command the king?". 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *242.
7. U. S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
8. Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions 262 (9th ed. 1950).
9. Ibid.
10. The Federalist No. LXXXI, at 125-26 (Bourne ed. 1947) (Hamilton).-S11. 3 Elliot's Debates 555 (2d ed. 1891).
12. 3 Id. at 533.
13. See note 10 supra.
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citizen of another state. 14 The case involved an action in assumpsit
brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia.
The court decided the action was maintainable, two of the majority
justices placing their decision squarely on the ground that any
state by its nature was subject to suit.' 5 One justice dissented on
the ground that at common law the sovereign could not be sued
without its consent, and the common law had been accepted in this
country 11 The decision resulted in a storm of protest among the
states, and immediately a constitutional amendment was introduced
in Congress which was quickly ratified and became the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution.'- That amendment includes a provision that the judicial power shall not extend to any action against
one of the states by citizens of another state.
In a later case the Supreme Court extended immunity to suits
against the states by their own citizens,' 8 thus completely excluding
from the jurisdiction of the federal courts actions against the state
by citizens, where the states have not consented to the suit."0 Furthermore, the influence of national opinion evidenced in passage of
the eleventh amendment, combined with wide acceptance of the
principle of sovereign immunity as contained in the common law,
led to adoption of state immunity as a jurisdictional limitation by
early state court decisions.20
For the most part, the early opinions adopted the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without question. Judicial attempts to justify or examine the doctrine came only after the principle had been thoroughly established. 21 While the maxim "Tihe
King can do no wrong" was early stated to have no application in
14. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U. S. (2 DalI.) *419 (1793) The decison
was in effect overruled by passage of the Eleventh Amendment. Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 11 (1890).
15. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U. S. (2 DalI.) *419, *456, *468 (1793).
16. Id. at *435-50 (dissenting opinion)
17 See Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions 263 (9th ed. 1947)
See also Note, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 135 (1929), for discussion of the effect of
the amendment in suits against state officers.
18. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.1 (1890)
19. Of course the federal judicial power extends to suits against a state
by another state, U. S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1, and includes jurisdiction of
suits against a state by the United States. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S.
621, 643 (1892). Nor does the prosecution of a writ of error to review a
judgment of a state court on Constitutional grounds prosecute a suit against
the state within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment. Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U. S.(6 Wheat.) 264, 405-12 (1821)
20. See Kiersted v. New York, 1 Abb. Pr. 385. 386-391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1855) , cf. Metz v. Soule, Kretsinger & Co., 40 Iowa 236, 239-242 (1875)
21. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S.196, 207 (1882) Adoption of
governmental immunity in this country has been explained as the result of
"slavish adherence to precedent." See Watkins. The State As A Party
Litigant 55 (45 Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies No. 1, 1927).
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this country,2 2 at other times the element of indignity to a state in
"hauling it into court" was stressed.2 3 However, it was not until
1907 that an attempt was made to justify the doctrine as a legal
principle when Justice Holmes declared, ". .'. [T]here can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends."24 But the most recent justification is made in
terms of the natural repugnancy of allowing an individual citizen
to "stop the government in its tracks." -' Some writers have recognized that the public policy in favor of noninterference with the
performance of governmental functions is an important factor to
be considered, and should be balanced against the need for judicial
protection of individual rights from illegal state action.20
Whatever the justification, or lack of it, it is a firmly established
legal principle in this country that both the federal and state governments are immune from suits by citizens in the absence of consent, and four state constitutions expressly provide that the state
may not be made a defendant in any suit at law or in equityY
PART

II. LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE

IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Although the inmunity principle is well established in this country, it is generally recognized that the sovereign has the lcgal right
to consent to be sued,25 which, combined with recognition of a inoral
22. See Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 342-43 (1879). Notwithstanding express denial of the applicability of the maxim in this country,
Professor Borchard asserts the maxim is the real explanation of axiomatic

acceptance of governmental immunity. See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. 1, 39-40 (1926).
23. I re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 505 (1887). Yet in United States v. Lee,
the court had minimized the notion of indignity. 106 U. S. 196, 206 (1882).
24. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1907). Although
Justice Holmes refers to Hobbes, the similarity of his statement with that of
Blackstbne is striking. See note 7 supra. For an exhaustive refutation of both
the logi6 and practicality of the statement see Borchard, Govencustal Responsibilityin Tort, 36 Yale L. J. 757, 1039 (1927).
25. "The Government... cannot be stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff
who presents a disputed question of property or contract right." Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 704 (1949). Yet one
writer states that public policy does not support this statement. See Davis,
Sovereign Immunity In Suits Against Officers For Relief Other Than
Damages,40 Cornell L. Q. 3, 20 (1954).
26. See Block, Suits Against Government Officers And The Sovereign
Inmmnitv Doctrine. 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060, 1062 (1946); Note, 55 Colum.
L. Rev. 73, 81 (1955).
27 Ala. Const. art. 1, § 14, Ark. Const. art. 5, § 20; IlL Const. art AT,
§ 26; W. Va. Cost. art. VI, § 35. One state has a statutory provision to the
same effect Tenn. Code Ann. § 8634 (Williams 1934).
28. See Clark v. Barnard, 108,U. S. 436, 447 (1883); Beers v.
Arkansas, 61 U. S. (20 Hox.) 527, 529 (1857). However in states having a
constitutional prohibition of suits against the state, even the legislature cann6t waive state immunity. Mead v. Eagerton, 255 Ala. 66, 50 So. 2d 253
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obligation to compensate for injurious government action, 2 has
resulted in a limited degree of legislative modification of the immunity rule. Thus the Federal Congress," ° and most state legislatures 31 have recognized some responsibility for governmental
action, although for the most part modification of immunity has
been limited to claims for money damages. Even where the states
have consented to suit, or provided means for monetary relief, it is
generally recognized that the state may set the terms upon which
relief may be granted,32 which in some instances has resulted in
requirements so procedurally complicated as to limit the possibilities
33
of obtaining really effective relief.
The extent of legislative relaxation of the immunity rule differs
greatly from state to state as a result of variations in the applicable
provisions of state constitutions. While the constitutions of 17
states 34 are silent on the subject, 4 state constitutions expressly
provide that the state shall not be made a defendant in any court of
law or equity , The constitutions of 20 states provide that the state
may be sued in such manner as the legislature may direct, 0 but
(1951), Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 191 Ark. 629,
87 S.W 2d 394 (1935) , Hamill v. Koontz, 34 W Va. 439, 59 S. E. 2d 879
(1950). But cf. State v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d 218, 120
N. E. 2d 35 (1954) (consent to sue state "commission" permissible if state
funds unaffected).
29. E.g., Price v. Sims, 134 W Va. 173, 58 S. E. 2d 657 (1950) See
also Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 242, 247-249 (1942), 23 Minn. L. Rev. 827 (1939).
30. For discussion of statutes dealing with actions against the federal
government see Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal
System 1140-1150 (1953). See also Anderson, Recovery Front The United
States Under The Federal Tort Clains Act, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 456 (1947),
Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Clains Against The
United States, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1955), Note, The Constitutional Status
of the Court of Claims, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 527 (1955).
31. See Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, Payment of Clains
Against The State, Pub. No. 43 at 11-34 (1952), Report of the Subcommittee
on Immunity of the State from Suit, Clauns Against the State 1n Minnesota,
32 Minn. L. Rev. 539, 545-556 (1948) , Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506 (1955)
32. E.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U. S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)
(dictum).
33. For a classic example of the difficulty of obtaining a speedy remedy
under state statutory provisions for monetary relief, see Georgia R. Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U. S.299, 302-303 (1952)
34. Including Minnesota. "The exemption of the state froni actions by
its citizens is not based on any constitutional provision, but merely on
grounds of public policy." St. Paul & Chicago Ry. v. Brown, 24 Minn. 517.
574 (1877).
35. See note 26 supra. The harshness of the constitutional prohibitions
has been modified by provision for a court of claims in Illinois, and by provision for administrative claims boards in the remaining three states. Ala.
Code Ann. tit. 55, § 333-344 (Supp. 1953) , Ark. Acts 1955, No. 276 at 586,
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, §§ 439.1-439.25 (1955), W Va. Code Ann. §§ 11431147(7) (1955).
36. Ariz. Const. art. 4,pt. 2, § 18, Cal. Const. art. 20, § 6, Del. Const.
art. 1, § 9; Fla. Const. art. 3, § 22, Ind. Const. art. 4, § 24, Iowa Const. art.
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these provisions have been held not to be self-executing, and as a
result immunity prevails unless the legislatures have provided statutory means of suing the state."7 While in general the remaining
state constitutions recognize the legislative prerogative, the provisions vary in scope from provision for a court of claims subject
only to jurisdictional limitation by the legislature, to requirement
that claims be submitted to the state auditor before legislative consideration may be had.38
Regardless of constitutional provisions, virtually all of the states
have found means to insure governmental responsibility when desired, and disagreement lies only in the method to be used.30 The
constitutional guarantee of a citizen's right to petition his government for redress of grievances 0 became the first vehicle by which
most state legislatures recognized moral responsibility for governmental action.41 Even today almost all state legislatures" entertain
3, § 31; Ky. Const. § 231; La. Const. art. 3, § 35;'Neb. Const. art. V, § 22;
Nev. Const. art IV, § 73; N. D. Const. art. I, § 22; Ohio Coast. art. I, § 16;
Ore. Const art IV, § 24; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 11; S. C. Const. art. 17, § 2;

S. D. Const. art. III, § 27, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17; Wash. Coast. art. 2,
§ 26; Wis. Const. art. IV, § 27; Vyo. Const. art. I, § 8. While the constitutions of Iowa and Louisiana do not expressly permit legislative consent, it
would seem consent is contemplated by the cited provisions.
37. E.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N. .
2d 82, cert. denied, 332 U. S. 817 (1947), Scates v. Board of Comm'rs., 196
Tenn. 274, 265 S. W. 2d 563 (1954). But cf. Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123
P 2d 505 (1942).
38. The New York Constitution creates a court of claims which has
been given broad jurisdictional powers virtually abolishing state immunity.
N. Y. Const. art. 6, § 23; N. Y. Ct CL Act, §§ 8, 9. But see Davison, Claims
Against the State of New York 80-90 (1954). While the Michigan Constitution provides that an ex officio administrative board shall hear claims, the
board has been replaced by a court of claims which is part of the regular
judiciary. Ifich. Const. art. VI, § 20; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 691.101-691.123,
691.141-691.152 (1948), § 691.123a (Mason Supp. 1954), Mich. Pub. Acts
1955, No. 267 See Abbott v. Michigan State Industries, 303 ,Mich. 575, 579,
6 N. W 2d 900, 901 (1942).
The constitutions of Idaho and North Carolina provide all claims shall
be submitted to the state supreme court which shall recommend approval or
disapproval by the legislature. Idaho Const. art. 5, § 10; N. C. Coast. art. IV,
§ 9. However the Idaho Constitution also provides for an administrative
claims board and the supreme court hears only claims rejected by that
board. Idaho Const. art. 4, § 18; State ex rel. Hansen v. Parsons, 57 Idaho
775, 784-788, 69 P 2d 788, 791-793 (1937).
The Constitutions of Montana, Nevada, and Utah provide for ex officio
claims boards subject to legislative control. Mont, Const. art. VII, § 20;
Nev. Const. art. V, § 107; Utah Const. art.VII, § 13. Yet the Nevada Constitution also permits legislative consent to suit in the courts. Nev. Const.
art. IV, § 73. The constitution of Missouri provides only that the comptroller
shall pre-approve all claims and certify them to the auditor. Mo. Coast. art.

4, § 22.

39. See Report of The Subcommittee on Immunity of the State from
Suit, Claims Against The State In Minnesota, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 539, 541
(1948).

40. UI. S. Const.amend. I.

41. See Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 242,249 (1942).
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private bills,12 either adjudicating the claim in legislative committee and awarding a direct appropriation, or granting the particular
claimant permission to sue the state in the regular courts. 43 But the
amount of time spent in consideration of private bills has detracted
from legislative consideration of bills of a general public interest.
As a result almost all state legislatures have utilized the administrative branch of government in claims adjustment, either allowing the
department heads or a state financial officer to make routine paystates, creating special adments, 44 or, as has been done in twenty
4
ministrative boards for the purpose. 5
Thus even where sovereign immunity is a bar to suit ii the
regular courts a claimant may either petition the legislature, or, in
many states, present his claim to a special administrative agency As
compared with adjudication in the regular courts, the legislative and
administrative methods impose definite disadvantages on the claimant. Frequently administrative decisions may be appealed to the
legislatures, which appeal results in duplication of work for which
the legislature has created the administrative board. Furthermore,
it imposes costly delay in awaiting determination by busy legislative
committees, 6 and there is the ever-present danger that political
considerations may govern the decision. 47 A more serious disad42. However two state constitutions expressly forbid private bills, both
as to individual appropriations and as to legislative consent to suit by a particular claimant. Ind. Const. art. 4, § 24, Ore. Const. art. IV, § 24. Two other
states prohibit appropriation for claims by special act. Colo. Const. art. V,
§ 28, N. Y. Const. art. 3, § 19. See Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506, 508-509
(1955).
43. E.g., Minn. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 746, § 10 (direct award), § 74
(consent to suit) , N. Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 699 (consent to suit) Rhode
Island re-enacts a special legislative committee at each session for claims
adjudication, R. I. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 3438, and in 1955 Oklahoma apparently
waived its immunity retroactively for the year 1953-1954. See Okia. Sess.
Laws 1955, at p. 614.
44. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 17.03 (1943), Md. Ann. Code art. 19, § 19
(1951).
45. E.g., Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 878. Although many of the boards
have jurisdiction over "all claims," the scope of jurisdictional grants range
all the way from South Carolina's provision for claims for services or material
furnished and tax refunds, to Minnesota's grant of power to hear all claims
(with minor exceptions) which the state should "in equity and good conscience" pay. E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-858 (1943) (all claims) , Minn. Sess.
Laws 1955, c. 878, § 11(1) , S. C. Code § 30-251 (1952). For a statement of
the jurisdiction and membership of many of the boards see Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, Payment of Claims Against the State, Pub. No.
43 at 23-28 (1952).
46. See Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, op. cit. sup'ra note

45, at 8-9.

47 Id. at 10. In one instance a legislator purportedly made a "slight
charge" of one-third the amount of the claim in return for introducing the
claimant's bill. The money was allegedly to be used to "buy new hats for
members of the house claims committee." Report of The Subcommittee on
Immunity of the State from Suit, Claims Against the State in Minnesota, 32
Minn. L. Rev. 539, 544 (1948).
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vantage lies in the lack of legal training of most administrative
officers and legislators, which has resulted in the application of a
different kind of law where the state is a party, than is applied in
suits against citizens. 48

Problems involving property, contract, or tort principles are
common law questions, and it is obvious that the judicial branch
of government is by its very nature best qualified to deal with the
problems involved. 49 One state has recognized this fact by expressly providing that upon rejection of a claim by the legislature the
claimant may appeal to the regular state courts.10 While no state
has enacted legislation allowing the state to be sued in all cases and
for all forms of relief, at least 21 states have enacted statutes waiving a part of the state's immunity from suit in the regular courts,5 '
and in at least 9 other states, decisions of administrative claims
boards or officers may be appealed to the courts.52 The extent of
consent to suit varies from mere provision for joining the state as
defendant in cases where a municipality is foreclosing a tax lien, 3
to New York's waiver of virtually all immunity.34 Moreover, stat48. Frequently administrative boards are staffed with ex officio officers
who may formulate their own rules of evidence and procedure, or use personal knowledge of the facts in arrivmg at decisions. E.g., Ala. Code Ann.
tit. 55, § 337 (1940) (own rules), Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 82-1115 (1947)
(personal knowledge).-If a board member is interested however, at least one
state provides for disqualification. Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 878, § 8.
49. "It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice
against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between
private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims in their
nature belong to the judicial department" Statement of Abraham Lincoln.
6 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 51 (1897).
50. Wis. Stat § 285.01 (1953). However the statute does not apply to
claims based in tort, or those demanding relief in equity. Trempealeau
County v. State, 260 Wis. 602, 604-605, 51 N. W 2d 499, 500 (1952) (dictum).
51. E.g., Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 878, § 2(1) (contract); Minm.
Stat §§ 559.013 as amended, Minn. Sess. Laws 1955. c. 332, § 1, 582.13
(1953) (title to, or encumbrances on, real property). See Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, Payment of Claims Against the State, Pub. No.
43 at 30 (1952).
Illinois, Michigan, and New York have established a court of claims,
although the Illinois court is not considered part of the regular judiciary
because of the constitutional prohibition of suits against the state in its
-egular courts. N. Y. Const. art. 6, § 23, Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, §§ 439.1-439.25
(1955); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 691.101-691.123, 691.141-691.152 (1948),
§ 691.123a (Mason Supp. 1954), Mich. Pub. Acts 1955, No. 267.
A few states have obtained judicial expertise by separate court-like
bodies. E.g., S. D. Code § 33.4301 (Supp. 1952) (circuit court judge) ; NV.
Va. Code Ann. § 1145 (1955) (att'y gen'l).
52. Ariz. Code Ann. § 27-101 (1939), Cal. Gov. Code Ann. § 16041
(West 1955); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44.140 (Baldwin 1955); Miss. Code
Ann. § 4387 (1942); Nev. Comp. Laws § 9200 (1929); N. C. Gen. Stat.
§ 143.293 (1952) ; Pa. Stat Ann. tit 72. § 1104 (Purdon 1949) ; S. D. Code
§ 33.0604 (1939) ; Va. Code Ann. § 8-752 (1950).
53. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 196.08 (1943).
54. N. Y. Const. art. 6. § 23: N. Y. Ct. Cl. Act. §§ 8, 9. But see
Davison, Claims Against the State of New York 80-90 (1954).
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utes waiving immunity are strictly construed as being in derogation
of state sovereignty, 55 and in the absence of an express provision to
the contrary, consent is usually limited to non-tort claims for
monetary relief. 6
It would seem that judicial expertise may frequently be obtained even in jurisdictions forbidding suits against the state in the
regular courts, by submitting a given claim to the regular administrative claims board, and seeking "judicial review" of the administrative decision. Although the Minnesota statute expressly forbids
either appeal or review by the courts of administrative claims board
decisions,5 7 it would seem that, in states where the statute forbids
only appeal58 or is silent on the question, the regular procedure for
judicial review of administrative determinations might apply "i'
Where no provision has been made, a few courts have stated that
administrative claims determinations are subject to prerogative
writs, 60 and where funds had been appropriated, mandamus has
been issued to compel allowance of a valid contract claim by a state
claims board,6" even as against a defense on the ground of sovereign
immunity 62 On the other hand, where the statutes expressly forbid
appeal the courts have reached a different result. In a recent Pennsylvania case the claimant petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus directing the administrative board, which had disallowed the
claim, to show cause why its decision should not be reversed and
55. See Maloney v. State, 207 Misc. 894, ., 141 N. Y. S. 2d 207, 215
(Ct. Cl. 1955) (dictum) But see Marler v. State, 78 So. 2d 26, 30 (La.
App. 1955).
56. Frequently statutes extend jurisdiction to all claims. E.g., Wash.
Rev. Code § 4.92.010 (1951) Yet "claims" has been equated with actions for
money. See Wiseman v. State, 98 N. H. 393. 396-397, 101 A. 2d 472, 475
(1953). Actions based in tort or demanding relief in equity are usually not
considered "claims" within the statutory term. See, e.g., Trempealcatl County
v. State, 260 Wis. 602, 604-605. 51 N. \V 2d 499, 500 (1952)
57 Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 878, § 3.
58. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47.1486 (1952) See also Teni. Code Ann.
§ 1034.35 (Williams Supp. 1952) (decision of board is "final").
59. For discussion of the scope of judicial review of administrative
action, see Davis, Administrative Law 812-928 (1951). See also Riesenfeld,
Bauman, Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Mcans of
the ExtraordinarvRemedies in Minnesota, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 569, 685 (1949),
36 Minn. L. Rev. 435, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1952).
60. State cx rel. McQueen v. Brandon, 244 Ala. 62, 65, 12 So. 2d 319,
321 (1943) (dictum) , cf. Madden v. Riley, 53 Cal. App. 2d 814, 821, 128 P
2d 602, 606 (3d Dist. 1942) It has been held error for a lower court to
sustain a demurrer in an action for mandamus to compel a claims board to
hear a claim. Calhoun County v. Brandon, 237 Ala. 537, 187 So. 868 (1939)
61. State ex rel. McDowell, Inc. v. Smith, 334 Mo. 653, 67 S. W 2d
50 (1933)
62. U'Ren v. State Board of Control, 31 Cal. App. 6, 159 Pac. 615, (Ist
Dist. 1916).
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award made to the claimant. 63 The court denied the writ, stating that
where appeal is expressly forbidden by statute, the scope of appellate review is limited to questions of regularity and jurisdiction
and that claimant could not have the merits of his claim judicially
reviewed in circumvention of the statute by means of a "veiled substitute for appeal." 64 Yet the court added that where the statute :s
silent on the question of appeal, review by certiorari may be had in
65
the "broadest sense"
Many states have replaced or supplemented the extraordinary
remedies with general statutes providing for judicial review of
administrative action. 66 While, as yet, the question of the extent of
judicial review of administrative claims board decisions permitted
under these acts has not arisen, the Illinois court has held that a
proceeding to review a determination of the Board of Revenue
under that state's Administrative Review Act was not an encroachment on the state's constitutional provision for sovereign immunity.
The court stated that since the purpose of the action was to review
quasi-judicial determinations and was not an original action against
the state, sovereign immunity did not apply.67 It would seem the
same rationale might be applied to judicial review of administrative
claims board decisidns, and that judicial review may well be the
means by which the courts could achieve additional modification of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, although as yet this method of
modification has been little used.
Thus it appears that the trend m state legislative modification of
sovereign immunity, has been from legislative determination, to
administrative adjudication,68 and more recently toward consent to
suit in the regular courts. 3 Modification has been gradual, however, and has been impeded by legislative reluctance to permit
63. Kaufman Const. Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A. 2d 534 (1947).
64. Id. at 520-521, 55 A. 2d at 537.
65. Id. at 519, 55 A. 2d at 536. Yet the Tennessee court has held that
certiorari does not lie to permit review of findings of fact made by adimmistrative claims boards, basing its decision on the grounds of sovereign immunity.
Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. 201, 54 S. W. 2d 953 (1932).
66. E.g., Ill. Rev. Stat c. 110, §§ 264-279 (1955), N. C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 143-306 through 143-316 (Supp. 1955).
67. Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, 410 IlL 35, 101 N. E.
2d 71 (1951). Similar reasoning was used by Justice Marshall in holding
that a writ of error to a state court did not prosecute a suit against the state.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. (6 Wheat) 264, 405-412 (1821).
68. See Note, Adminiqstering Claims Against the Slate, 68 Harv. L. Rev.

506, 517 (1955).

69. A number of states have consented to suit in the regular courts only
within the last five years. E.g., Minm. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 878, § 2; N. H.
Sess. Laws 1953, c. 243.
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money judgments to be enforced by the courts.10 As a result, in all
states, regardless of the extent of modification of the immunity
doctrine, the legislatures retain some power to pay or refuse to pay
the judgments determined by the adjudicating authority 7' Yet in
states which have waived immunity, experience has shown the
financial burden is not excessive, 72 and legislative appropriation in
satisfaction of money judgments has become a matter of routine,
7
with the legislatures rarely acting unfavorably upon any judgment. 1
PART III.

JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF THE
IMMIUNITY DOCTRINE

Although many of the hardships of the sovereign immunity principle have been relaxed by legislative provisions, amelioration of
the inequities of sovereign immunity has not been confined to the
legislatures. A doctrine so at odds with democratic principles was
regarded with judicial disfavor in this country, 71 and, once the desire to confine immunity was formulated, the judiciary soon found
the means by which modification could be accomplished within
existing legal principles. The rationale stemmed from a logical but
completely conceptual application of the maxim, "The King can do
no wrong." While in England personification of sovereignty in the
person of the King may have been possible, attempts to adopt tls
reasoning in the United States 75 resulted in the postulation of the
abstract State as sovereign. Since the ideal State could only act by
70. Where the states have consented to suit in the courts the statutes
frequently include an express provision forbidding levy and execution in
enforcement of a judgment against the state. E.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 4389
(1942), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 4-1506 (Burns Supp. 1955) But ef. Ky. Rev.
Stats. § 44.140 (1955) , N. Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 20.
71. In a few states awards up to a stipulated sum do not need legislative approval. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws c. 12, § 3 A (1952) (up to $1000),
N. C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291 (Supp. 1955) (up to $10,000)
72. See McDonald, The Administration of a Tort Liabilitv Law in New
York, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 262, 280 (1942), Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev.
506, 517 (1955). See also Comment, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 914, 917 (1953)
73. See Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, Payment of Claims
Against the State, Pub. No. 43 at 15 (1952) , Shumate, Tort Claims Against
State Governments, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 242, 261 (1942)
74. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U. S. (2 DalI.) 419, 457 (1793) As
recently stated in a dissent by Justice Carter of the California Supreme
Court, "The entire doctrine of governmental immunity rests upon a rotten
foundation, and professors, writers and liberal-minded judges are of the
view that it should be placed in the judicial garbage can where it belongs."
Talley v. Northern San Diego Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal. 2d 33, 43, 257 P 2d 22,
28 (1953).
75. Use of monarchial notions of sovereignty in a democratic form of
government has been termed a "mystery of legal evolution." Borchard,
Government Liabilitv In Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 4 (1924). Moreover, the
argument that the states of the Union are sovereign under the Constitution
has been shown to have no logical basis. Willis, The Doctrine of Sovereignty
Under the United States Constitution, 15 Va. L. Rev. 437, 456-457 (1929)

1956]

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF STATES

245

law, whatever the State did must be lawful. On this ground a distinction was drawn between the State and its government, which
consisted of its officers, and since the State could not commit an
illegal act, any such act was imputed to government officers. It
logically followed tbat a suit against state officers was not necessarily a suit against the State.
Application of the theory, however, was difficult in particular
cases, and the courts soon developed formalistic tests to determine
whether a suit against a government officer was a suit against the
State. At an early date Chief Justice Marshall decided the question
could be resolved by looking at the record, if the State were not
named as party defendant, it was not a suit against the State. "r
While the artificiality of this test led to its abandonment,-- a few
recent state court decisions indicate that the name of the party on
the record will still influence the result.7 Most courts however do
not rely on the record, but state the general test as being whether
the suit, while nominally against an officer, would be "in substance"
one against the state.80 Yet it is doubtful that this test is helpful in
deciding particular cases, or that it is anything other than a restatement of the question it is supposed to answer.
Perhaps the-State may have an abstract existence apart from its
officers, yet it is obvious that the State cannot act except through its
administrative officers and agencies. As a result, the principle that
a judicial order operating against a state officer does not operate
against the state, will in many cases amount to pure fiction. 8 ' That
the courts are not unaware of the practical effect of applying the
fiction is illustrated by a recent Supreme Court decision. In refusing an injunction prohibiting a federal officer from breaching a
contract the Court stated.:
"In a suit against the officer to recover damages.. The judg76. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270. 290-291 (1884).
77. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 738, 856857 (1824).
78. In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887).
79. See Leger v. Kelley, 116 A. 2d 429, 431 (Conn. 1955). One court
has refused relief solely on the ground that the plaintiff had named a state
agency, not the officers individually, as defendant on the record. Schloss v.
State Highway & Public Works Comm'n, 230 N. C. 489, 53 S. . 2d 517
(1949). As a result action is frequently brought against the officer in his

official role and individually in case sovereign immunity bars recovery from
the officer officially. See, e.g., Dunn v. Schmid, 239 IMinn. 559, 60 N. W 2d
14 (1953), which also re-affirmed the rule of sovereign immunity in Minnesota.
80. The general "rule" is that if the relief sought against the officer

will control the action of the state or subject it to liability, the suit is barred
by sovereign immunity. See Yoerg v. Iow-a Dairy Industry Comm'n, 244
Iowa 1377, 1379, 60 N. W. 2d 566, 567 (1953).

81. See Davis, Sovereign Immunity In Suits Against Officers For Relief
Other Than Damages,40 Cornell L. Q. 3, 9 (1954).
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ment sought will not require action by the sovereign or disturb
the sovereign's property
The question becomes difficult
and the area of controversy is entered when the suit is not one
for damages but specific relief i.e., the recovery of specific
property or monies, ejectment from land, or injunction either
directing or restraining the defendant officer's actions. In each
such case the question is directly posed as to whether, by obtaining relief against the officer, relief will not, in effect, be
obtained against the sovereign. For the sovereign can act only
through agents and, when an agent's actions are restrained, the
sovereign itself may, through him, be restrained."82
While this statement is true enough, the decisions discussed in
the following sections indicate that specific relief against state
officers may frequently be obtained, and that judicial adoption of
the fiction has been one of the prime methods of limiting governmental immunity from suit.
A. Action Against State Officers for Specific Relief,
The Affirnatve-Negatve Distinction
As might be expected, the fiction that an action seeking specific
relief against the official acts of state officers was not a suit against
the state itself was first used in resolving conflict between state
action and the Federal Constitution. Although the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that its decisions in this area are in
confusion, 3 the Court early stated that an action to restrain enforcement of an unconstitutional statute by a state officer was not
a suit against the state. 4 Even if the statute is constitutional on its
face, the courts have the power to enjoin unconstitutional acts of
state officers in its application." Moreover, the fiction has been
embodied in the rule that wherever an officer's acts conflict with
the Constitution, the officer is "stripped of his authority" and is
82. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687-

688 (1949).
83. See Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. S. 354, 359 (1941) , Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 709, 729-732 (1949).
In his dissent in the Larson case, Justice Frankfurter suggests an explanation of the confusion, and attempts a comprehensive classification of past decisions. The classification, however, has been severely criticized. See Davis,
Sovereign Immnunity In Suits Against Officers For Relief Other Than
Damages, 40 Cornell L. Q. 3, 26-30 (1954).
84. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 846858 (1824). Thus a state governor may be enjoined, Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U. S. 378, 393 (1932), and while the Court has refused to enjoin the
President, State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866),
the Court has sustained an injunction against a cabinet officer enforcing an
executive order of the President. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U. S. 579 (1952).

85. Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 390-391
(1894). The state courts have similar power. E.g., Federal Compress &
Warehouse Co. v. Call, 221 Ark. 537, 254 S. W 2d 319 (1953).

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF STATES
personally subject to suit.

6

By use of similar reasoning, recent

state court opinions indicate that even a state agency, or a whole
administrative board may be "stripped of its authority" and enjoined
from the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.8 7 In addition,
particular acts of state officers have been enjoined even where no
statute was directly involved, on the ground that the officer is
"stripped of his authority" where his acts are in conflict with the
fourteenth amendment-88
Yet where injunction of particular acts of state officers is sought
under the fourteenth amendment, application of the rule that the
officer is "stripped of his authority" results in an inconsistency. If
the fiction is adopted, it would appear that the officer's acts are not
the acts of the state. As a result it would seem that the officer's acts
could not be a violation of the fourteenth amendment for that
amendment has been held to apply only to state action. 9 Although
the Supreme Court in one case indicates that the fourteenth amendment does apply to the unauthorized acts of state officers if their
office or position has made commission of the act possible, 0 the
verbal conflict remains, and the result is an anomaly in the law, in
concept if not in practice.?'
While injpnwtion of unconstitutional action by state officers is
usually permitted, the extent to which other relief is available is
limited by the technical prerequisites found in the available remedies. 92 In addition a citizen seeking specific relief must overcome
judicial refusal to compel affirmatve action by state officers. Thus
in a recent federal case, the court refused to compel an exercise of
the power of eminent domain even though plaintiff alleged that his
86. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
87 Abelson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State Board of Optometrists, 5 N. J.
412, 75 A. 2d 867 (1950) ; American Federation of Labor v. Mann, 188 S. V.
2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; accord Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388. 122
N. W 251 (1909); cf. McInerney v. Ervin, 46 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1950);
Georgia Public Service Comm'n. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 205 Ga. 863, 55
S. E. 2d 618 (1949).
88. Georgia Public Service Comm'n v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 205 Ga.
863, 55 S. E. 2d 618 (1949) (individual members of utility commission enjoined from enforcing a rate adjustment alleged to be in violation of the
fourteenth amendment).
89. Ex ParteVirginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879).
90. See Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S.
278, 287-88 (1913).
91. For further discussion of the problem see Note, 50 Harv. L. Rev.
956, 960-962 (1937).
92. For discussion of the procedural requirements peculiar to each of
the extraordinary remedies, see Riesenfeld, Bauman, Maxwell, Judicial Control of Adininistrative Action. by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies isn
Minnesota,33 Minn. L. Rev. 569, 685 (1949). 36 Minn. L. Rev. 435, 37 Minn.
L. Rev. 1 (1952). In the state courts relief is seldom sought by means of
injunction and most actions are brought by means of one of the extraordinary
remedies. See Davis, Administrative Law § 219 (1951). While an action for a
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property had been taken by state officers without prior just cornpensation in violation of the state constitution and without due
process of law 93 The court based its refusal on the ground that to
require an exercise of eminent domain would require an affirmative
exercise of sovereign power by the state. The court also suggested
that plaintiff's remedy was by injunction against further invasion
of plaintiff's land by the officer until the state should bring eminent
domain and condemn the land.9 4 The dissenting justice, however,
voiced strong protest to the use of an artificial "affirmative-negative" distinction to defeat protection of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights.9" While the state courts have usually rccognized that an
action seeking affirmative relief in a suit against state officers is
prohibited by sovereign immunity, a few courts have issued writs
of mandamus requiring the instigation of condemnation proceedings
by state officers even though it would require affirmative action by
the state.96 In answer to an objection on the ground of sovereign
immunity, the Illinois court applied the fiction that the "state" does
not violate the constitution, and if it is violated it is the act of the
officer and relief may be granted against the officer without violating sovereign' immunity 11 Nevertheless, where the plaintiff omits
to plead unconstitutionality in seeking specific relief against state
officers, the decisions discussed in the following sections indicate
that the courts may or may not find the suit barred as being a stit
against the state.
Actions involving title to land
In the absence of an express statutory consent to the adjudication of title disputes in the regular courts, "8 the decisions are in
declaratory judgment may impose fewer technicalities, one court has held a
declaratory judgment action to be a suit against the state where a "proprietary" right of the state was involved. General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle, 207
Misc. 362, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1954).
93. People of Colorado v. District Court, 207 F 2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953).
94. Id. at 57-58.
95. Id. at 59.
96. People ex rel. First Nat. Bank v. Kingery, 369 I1. 289, 16 N. E, 2d
761 (1938), State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N. W 2d 70 (1945);
Riggs v. State Road Comm'r, 120 W Va. 298, 197 S. E. 813 (1938), Haycock v. Jannarone, 99 N. J. L. 183, 122 AtlI. 805 (1923) (dictum) . cf. State
Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941) But cf. Eriksen v.
Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 79 S. E. 2d 597 (1954).
97 People ex rel. First Nat. Bank v. Kingery, 369 Ill. 289, 291-293, 16
N. E. 2d 761, 763 (1938) The court also emphasized the constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every wrong. Ibid.
98. Many state legislatures have expressly consented to adjudication of
title questions in the courts. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 582.13 (1953) as amended,
Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 332, § 1. Frequently the statutes provide that no
judgment for money shall be given against the state under the provision. E.g..
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-9 (1953).
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conflict as to whether an action against state officers or agencies to
quiet title to land is an action against the state and barred by
sovereign immunity. Although the Supreme Court early stated that
a "mere suggestion of title in the state" does not forbid the court
from taking jurisdiction and determining questions of title,"3 0 one
state court has held that where the state is named as party defendant, an action to quiet title is barred as an action against the
state.100 Where action is brought against state officers or agencies,
a few decisions have barred the actions on the ground that the relief
sought against the officer or agency would interfere with state property.30 On the other hand, an action against a state agency has
been allowed on the theory that no claim is asserted against the
state or its land, but the plaintiff only seeks to retain that which is
10 2
his own.
It is evident that a determination of title is required in order to
decide whether an action to quiet title brought against a state
officer is an action involving state lands, or is simply an action in
which plaintiff is seeking to retain that wich is his own. Yet the
courts pretend to adjudcate only the jurisdictional issue of sovereign
immunity, without adjudicating title.
In a recent Alabama decision the plaintiff answered a bill to
quiet title filed by the state, by alleging title in himself, and praying
that his answer might be taken as a cross-bill. The court held that
the state could not be sued without its consent and this would bar
a cross-bill seeking affirmatwe relief against the state, just as it
V 03
would bar an original bill.
Noting, however, that plaintiff was
required by statute to allege title in his answer to the state's complaint, the court stated, "In other words, instead of granting him
relief on the cross-bill, relil is granted to him on his answer .... " 101
While the court achieved a just result by judicial manipulation, it
is doubtful that a. distinction between "affirmative action on a crossbill" and "relief on an answer" is realistic, and even more doubtful
that the "affirmative-negative" distinction is at all helpful in dealing
with land title actions against the state.
Where an action is brought to restrain a state officer from
99. United States v. Peters, 9 U. S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139 (1809) (title
to bonds), quoted and applied as to land in United States v. Lee, 106 U. S.
196,210 (1882).

-

100. Rothrock v. Loon Island, 96 N. H. 421, 78 A. 2d 512 (1951).
101. Walsh v. University of Texas, 169 S. W 2d 993 (Tex. Civ. App.

1942); cf. Reed v. Timberman, 65 Ohio App. 182, 29 N. E. 2d 446 (1940)

(ejectment against state officer).

102. Lyon v. State, 283 P. 2d 1105 (Idaho 1955).

103. State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 66 So. 2d 141 (1953).
104. Id. at 183, 66 So. 2d at 145-146.
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placing a cloud on title it has been held that sovereign immunity
bars the action, on the ground that the state officer is exercising
administrative authority in his determination of the state's right
to place the cloud on title, and that a suit against an officer acting
within his authority is a suit against the state. 1' In one case, in
which sovereign immunity was not raised, the court emphasized
plaintiff's right to obtain relief after the cloud is placed, implying
that to require plaintiff to proceed in that manner is likely to be less
of a burden on the performance of governmental functions."" Yet
it is at least doubtful that public policy requires a distinction between preventive relief by injunction of the illegal acts of state
officers, and remedial relief after the cloud is placed, especially if
plaintiff must overcome sovereign immunity in seeking subsequent
relief by way of an action for damages. As a result, judicial refusal
to entertain an action to restrain a state officer from placing a
cloud on title is to allow administrative officers to adjudicate questions of title to land and deny the plaintiff a remedy, solely on the
ground of judicial respect for an exercise of sovereign discretion.I'T
As a matter of policy there can be little doubt that courts are
by their very nature more competent to adjudicate questions of title
to land, and it is equally clear the courts have the power to entertain title actions against state officers. For example, one court has
stated that if jurisdiction of actions to remove a cloud on title against
the state is refused, the plaintiff is denied a remedy in violation of
a constitutional provision of a remedy for every wrong."' Moreover, other courts have held that illegal administrative action in
placing a cloud on title is depriving an individual or property vithout due process of law, and that courts may entertain an action to
cancel the cloud, regardless of sovereign immunity 109
Specific relief against tortious acts by state officers
The Supreme Court has recently refused to enjoin merely
tortious or "wrongful" official action by a federal officer, where the
105. Giles v. Poole, 239 S. W 2d 665 (1951) appeal dismissed, 151
Texas 224, 248 S. W 2d 464 (1952)
106. See Rankin v. Williams, 221 Ark. 110, 252 S. W 2d 551 (1952),
cert. denied, 345 U. S. 956 (1953).
107 See Giles v. Poole, 239 S. W 2d 665 (1951), appeal dismissed. 151
Texas 224, 248 S.W 2d 464 (1952).
108. See State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Lewis, 197 Okla. 288,
290, 170 P 2d 237, 239 (1946) The constitutional provisions guaranteeing a
remedy for every wrong, found in most state constitutions, e.g., Minn. Const.
art. I, § 8, are potentially a means by which sovereign immunity could be
overcome. To date however, the clauses have not been relied upon, and are
only mentioned in conjunction with other grounds for permitting suit.

109. Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 126Colo. 438, 250 P 2d
1007 (1952) , cf. State v. Sanders, 203 Miss. 475, 35 So. 2d 529 (1948)
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officer has not exceeded his authority, recognizing that to enjoin a
federal officer is frequently to enjoin the government itself.110 A
few state courts, however, have granted injunction on the ground
that an action based on the commission of torts by state officers is
a suit against the officer, and not against the state."'
No decisions have been found in which the "affirmative-negalive" distinction has been applied in deciding whether specific relief
against a state officer is available where the officer has committed
only a common law tort.112 This is perhaps due to the fact that instances in which prohibitory injunction, if granted, would not provide desired specific relief are exceedingly rare. Moreover, the
harshness of any refusal to grant affirmative specific relief from
the tortious acts of state officers would be considerably modified by
the constitutional
requirement of just compensation for a taking of
1
"property.")

3

Specific relief against breach of contract by state officers
Although mandamus has been issued to require a state officer to
perform a contract entered into on behalf of the state where there
was a "clear ministerial duty" to perforn, 14 mandamus usually
does not lie to enforce a wholly private contract right."25 Moreover,
injunction of the breach of a contract by state officers has been
refused on the ground that enjoining acts amounting to a breach
would in effect coerce performance by the sovereign itself, in direct
0
conflict with an expression of legislative policy." 6
The courts could apply the fiction that an officer breaching a contract is "stripped of his authority" by commission of a substantive
wrong, and hold that an action against the officer seeking either
injunction or mandamus is an action against the officer, not against
110. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682,
687-688 (1949).
111. Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 Utah 50, 224 P 2d 1037 (1950),

Merrill v. Bishop, 69 Wyo. 45, 237 P 2d 186 (1951). It has been held that

when state officers exceed their authority in interfering with the rights of

private property, they become trespassers and may be enjoined. See Joos v.
Illinois National Guard, 257 Ill. 138, 100 N. E. 505 (1913); Goergen v.
Dept. of Public Works, 123 Neb. 648, 243 N. V 886 (1932).
112. Yet the Tenth Circuit has drawn a distinction between affirmative
and negative relief against tortious acts which were a taking of property

within the constitutional provision for just compensation before a taking of
property. People of Colorado v. District Court, 207 F 2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953).
113. See note 96 supra. See Oberst & Lewis, Claims Against the State of
Kentucky-Reverse E nit
Domain, 42 Ky. L. J. 163 (1954).

114. Franklin DeKleine Co. v. Board of State Auditors, 289 Midch 658,
287 N. W 325 (1939).
115.

See Edelman v. Boardman, 332 Pa. 85, 2 A. 2d 393 (1938).

116. Musgrove v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49
S. E. 2d 26 (1948), appeal dismissed, 335 U. S.900 (1949).
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the state. The paucity of recent decisions seeking specific relief
against state officers in the area of contract is perhaps the result of
wide statutory provision for recovery of contract damages against
the state.'

17

Declaratoryrelief against illegal application of tax statutes
Although one court has stated that enactment of the declaratory

judgment act did not authorize a determination of liability against
the sovereign outside of the consent statutes,"" adjudication of tax
disputes in the regular courts is frequently obtained by way of an
action seeking a declaration of non-liability against a state officer '1"
Since no affirmative relief against the state is sought, the courts
reason that a tax official illegally applying a tax statute is "stripped
of his authority" and is not acting for the state.1 2 As a result the
declaratory judgment action has become a convenient method of
testing the legality of administrative action without running afoul
of sovereign immunity Outside the tax field, however, the remedy
has been little used in obtaining specific relief against state officers.1 2 '
The need for specific relief against state officers
To the extent that the "affirmative-negative" distinction prohibits the granting of specific relief against state officers, use of
the distinction results, in many instances, in a delegation of the
power to determine questions of substantive law and fact to administrative officers without any judicial review whatsoever While
the determination of some questions may be better made by administrative officers, use of the "affirmative-negative" distinction
found in sovereign immunity problems can hardly lead to an intelligent separation of administrative questions from problems of
substantive law which the courts are by experience more competent
to adjudicate.
If use of the fiction that an officer violating substantive law is
"stripped of his authority" is justified where injunction is sought,
117

See note 140 infra.

118. Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 21 Cal. 2d 399, 403, 132
P 2d 804, 806 (1942).
119. Brophy Coal Co. v. Matthews, 125 Mont. 212, 233 P 2d 397
(1951), Douglass v. Koontz, 137 W Va. 345, 71 S. E. 2d 319 (1952).
Berlowitz v. Roach, 252 Wis. 61, 30 N. W 2d 256 (1947). Contra Buchian v.
Shaw, 238 N. C. 522, 78 S. E. 2d 317 (1953).
120. Douglass v. Koontz, 137 W Va. 345, 71 S. E. 2d 319 (1952),
Berlowitz v. Roach, 252 Wis. 61, 30 N. W 2d 256 (1947).
121. In New York, a declaratory judgment action is a suit against the
state if a proprietary right of the state is involved. General Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Coyle, 207 Misc. 362,
., 136 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1954) ; see Lucas v. Banfield, 180 Ore. 437, 177 P 2d 244 (1947) (declaration of abutting landowner'"
rights of access to highway refused).
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it would seem that a suit to compel affirmative action by state officers is equally justified, for in many instances enjoining activity by
state officers and agencies will, in effect, coerce the sovereign to act
affirmatively. For example, a distinction between a judicial order
compelling the instigation of condemnation proceedings and one
granting an injunction until condemnation is brought, would seem
in reality to be a matter of form, not substance, especially where
the state has invested considerable funds in the activity enjoined.
As a result, judicial hesitancy to grant affirmative relief against acts
of state officers or agencies may frequently be overcome by the
simple expedient of wording a complaint in negative terms.
In spite of the "affirmative-negative" distinction, there can be
little doubt that a judicial order either enjoining or compelling
action by state officers will frequently amount to judicial coercion
of the state. Where the individual can be compensated in money,
judicial hesitancy to grant specific relief seems more justified. In
many states, however, sovereign immunity bars an action against
either the officer or the state for money damages. Judicial refusal to
grant specific relief against state officers committing an illegal act
or a substantive wrong frequently results, therefore, in leaving the
injured citizen without any remedy whatsoever, other than an appeal to the legislature.
In most instances the state has the power and means to reach a
desired goal in conformity with substantive law. For instance, the
state has the power of eminent domain, and, like citizens, should
have the option of breaching its contracts and responding in money
damages. In many instances therefore, a grant of specific relief
against state officers is not to "stop the government in its tracks"
permanently, but only to require that the desired goal be obtained
in a legal manner. If the government does not have the legal power
to reach a desired goal sought by a state officer in the commission
of a substantive wrong, and refuses to compensate for injurious
governmental action, it is at least doubtful that sovereign immunity
should protect state officers in reaching the goal in an illegal manner.
B. Actions Involving State Funds: The FinancialMyth
If a citizen could 'obtain monetary compensation for injurious
state action, a grant of specific relief to "stop the government" in
its tracks might seem less justified. Yet where a judgment against
a state officer would subject the state to liability, it will be seen
that most courts have held the suit is one against the state and
barred by sovereign immunity.
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Suts against state officers for return of illegally collected funds
That the courts are hesitant to award money judgments where
the state is involved is illustrated by cases in which it is sought to
recover illegally collected funds, or tax monies assessed and collected under a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional. In a
recent case the plaintiff brought suit against the Iowa Dairy Commissioner seeking a declaration that the statute tinder which taxes
had been assessed and collected from plaintiff was unconstitutional,
and for a writ of mandamus to compel repayment of the taxes. The
court held that the action was a suit against the state because it was
an attempt to compel the state to perform its implied promise to
return the taxes by suing the state treasurer.1 22 Other courts, however, have reached a different result even where no aligation of utinconstitutionality was made, holding that since the court had jurisdiction for declaratory purposes, it also had jurisdiction to order
2
a refund of illegally collected taxes by way of incidental relief.1 3
W\here suit is brought against a state officer solely for recovery
of monies, however, the courts usually find the suit barred by
sovereign immunity 124 The presumption is made that the officer
has surrendered all funds to the state treasury, and since any refund would necessarily be made from the treasury it would diminish
public funds.12 It might equally be asserted that no public funds are
diminished, because illegally collected taxes could never become
"public" funds even when placed in the treasury In this instance,
however, the presumption that the funds have been paid over into
the treasury overcomes the fiction that the officer acting illegally is

"stripped of his authority" and personally liable for the amount of
the collected taxes.
There can be little doubt that judicial refusal to apply the fiction
that the officer is "stripped of his authority" in these cases is based
122. Yoerg v. Iowa Dairy Industry Comm'n, 244 Iowa 1377, 60 N. W
2d 566 (1953). Nor may such refund be obtained through stit in the federal
courts. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946)
123. Horn v. Dunn Brothers, Inc., 79 So. 2d 11 (Ala. 1955) , American
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N. E. 2d 301 (1949) In
answering an objection that the decree would affect state funds, the Alabama
court observed that the state treasury would suffer no more thai it would
have had the defendant officer performed his duty originally, and the Oio
court noted recovery was not from the treasury, but from departmental
funds. Ibid.
124. E.g., Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Giles, 277 S. \V 2d 291
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) , Hamill v. Koontz, 134 W Va. 439, 59 S. E. 2d 879
(1950).
125. See, e.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Corsi, 186 Misc. 577 579, 61
N. Y. S. 2d 769, 770 (1946).
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on a desire to protect state officers from being held personally liable
for the performance of state functions in which they have no personal interest. Noting that the officer was innocent of wrongdoing,
ihe Missouri court recently stated, "It is more in accord with
should suffer
justice that the many persons paying the use tax
that
the
officials who
the loss . . of an inconsiderable sum, than
perform their duty in collecting and remitting the tax to the state
should be compelled to pay the aggregate sum collected after the
law is held unconstitutional."'' 2 Thus sovereign immunity has
forced the courts into a dilemma in which they must either protect
the officer from personal liability at the expense of the citizen, or
compensate the citizen at the expense of the officer. Refusal to
compel the state itself to refund illegally collected monies can only
be justified on the basis that the state may collect money unconstitutionally, and is protected from responsibility on the ground it
"can do no wrong."
Reverse eminent domain
While actions for refund of illegally collected funds are frequently barred by sovereign immunity, the courts are not always as
hesitant to impose liability on the state where the state or its officers
violate constitutwnal principles. The constitutional requirement of
just compensation made prior to the taking of property, t'2- has been
used to justify award of money judgments against the state even
where sovereign immunity is expressly raised in defense. Applying
what has been aptly termed the "reverse eminent domain" theory,12
some courts reason that the constitutional provisions are selfexecuting, and where state officers take, injure, or destroy private
property for public use without just compensation made prior to
the taking, governmental immunity is waived without legislative
consent, and the property owner may institute a suit for money
damages-against the state.' 9
126. Kieban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 18-19, 247 S. V 2d 832, 839 (1952).
127 E.g., "Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged
for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured."
Minn. Coast art- 1, § 13.
128. See Oberst & Lewis, Claims Against the State of KentuckyReverse Eawint Domain, 42 Ky. L. J. 163 (1954).
129. Lehman v. Williams, 301 Ky. 729, 193 S. AV. 2d 161 (1946), accord
Scorsune v. State, 224 La. 1031, 71 So. 2d 557 (1954). But cf. Arkansas State
Highway Commission v. Palmer, 222 Ark. 603, 261 S. W. 2d 772 (1953).
In State v. Stanley, 188 Minn. 390, 247 N. W 509 (1933), the Minnesota court held that sovereign immunity could not defeat the constitutional
requirement for compensation, and plaintiff could intervene m a condemnation proceeding. And in 1943, the court affirmed an order of the lower court
appointing appraisers to determine the amount of damages due an intervening
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The award of money damages in these cases would seem subject
to the same objections as are made to money judgments for recovery of taxes collected in violation of the Constitution that the
court has no means by which to enforce the judgment, and to award
money judgments against the state would impose an undue burden
on the performance of governmental functions. Yet no reason has
been advanced why sovereign immunity forbids the recovery of
tax monies in the state treasury collected under an unconstitutional
statute, but does not forbid the award of compensation out of the
treasury where property has been taken in violation of the constitution.
W\Vhile the courts have virtually abolished the defense of sovereign immunity in the field of eminent domain, the plaintiff in many
states still has the burden of bringing his suit within the technical
requirements of a "taking" within the meaning of the constitutional
provisions.' ° The state is not liable in tort, and as a result some
courts reason that a "taking" within the meaning of the constitution
can not result from an act of negligence. 31 On the other hand, it
has been held that damages to adjacent land were a "taking" even
though negligently inflicted.

32

Sitts againststate officers for damages ti tort
While it is almost universally held that the state is not subject
to suit in tort in the absence of statutory consent, the problem of
whether a suit against a state officer seeking damages in tort is a
suit against the state itself, is a problem subject to so many diverse
considerations that the reader is referred elsewhere for exhaustive
treatment of this problem.' 3' Yet one aspect of judicial limitation
landowner. State v. Bentley, 216 Minn. 146, 12 N. W 347 (1943) More
recently the court has indicated that a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling condemnation, not petition for intervention, is the proper procedural
method to be followed. State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N. W 2d 70
(1945)
130. See, e.g., State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 31, 286 P 2d 785 (1955)
(contract right barred by sovereign immunity). Moreover stits for conversion of personal property are frequently barred by sovereign immunity. Ellis
v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 286 P 2d 597 (Wyo. 1955) (beaver
pelts) , Dunn v. Schmid, 239 Minn. 559, 60 N. V 2d 14 (1953) (machinery)
131. For example the Virginia court reasons that the constitutional provision applies only to lawful acts, and has no application to the tortious acts
of state officers. Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 79 S. E. 597 (1954) One
court suggested the provision applies only where the "taking" is intentional.
See Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069,
., 34 So. 2d 321. 323 (1948)
132. Department of Highways v. Corey, 247 S. W 2d 389 (Ky. 1952),
cf. Nelson v. Wilson, 239 Minn. 164, 58 N. W 2d 330 (1953).
133. See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Offlcers, 21 Minn.
L. Rev. 263 (1937)
Peterson. Governmental Responsibilitv for Torts in
Minnesota, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 293 (1942).
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of statutes consenting to suit against the state for tort damages may
be mentioned in passing, as illustrative of a judicial attitude which
often recurs in sovereign immunity decisions.
Although only a few states have expressly consented to suit in
tort, 34 even in some of those states the statutory waiver has been
greatly limited by judicial creation of a two-fold immunity; immunity from suit and immunity from liability.1 35 As a result, even
though a state has expressly waived its "immunity from suit," a
few courts frequently deny relief under the judicial concept of
"immunity from liability."' 1 6 The result is judicial frustration of
legislative desire to abolish sovereign immunity in tort.
The distinction between "immunity from suit" and "immunity
from liability" can only be justified by saying the state has consented
to suit, but it has not consented to suit. Although the distinction
has received complete ridicule,, 37 the concept of "immunity from
liability" remains wholly a matter of judicial creation in direct
conflict with expressions of legislative desire. As a result, one legislature has recently enacted a statute expressly waiving its "immunity from liability" thereby preparing the ground for effective
consent to suit without judicial frustration of the waiver.'3
Suits against the state for damages in contract
The "immunity from liability" concept has fortunately not been
134. At least 3 states have consented to tort actions against the state in
a court of claims. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, § 439.8C (1955), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 27.3548(8) (Supp. 1954) ; N. Y. Ct. Cl. Act §§ 8, 9. In 4 other states the
courts may hear appeals from administrative claims board decisions in tort.
Ariz. Code Ann. § 27-101 (1939); Cal. Gov. Code Ann. § 16041 (West
1954) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 44.070, 44.141 (1953) ; N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-291,
143-293 (Supp. 1953). A few other states have consented to suits for tort
damages in specific instances. E.g., Conn. Stat § 964c (Supp. 1953) (highway injuries).
135. See Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist.. 41 Cal. 2d
33, 257 P 2d 22 (1953), .Manion v. State, 303 Mich. 1, 5 N. W. 2d 527, ccrt.
denied, 317 U. S. 677 (1942).
136. E.g., Shuey v. State of Michigan, 106 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich.
1952) (governmental function). Even though the New York statute expressly waives immunity from liability and action, N. Y. Ct. Cf. Act § 8, the
state is immune from liability in the performance of some governmental
functions. Goldstein v. State, 281 N. Y. 396, 24 N. E. 2d 97 (1939).
137. "It should not lightly be presumed by this Court that the supreme
legislative power of the State by enacting this statute intended merely to
engage in the futile, if not' foolish, business of rehearsing the sovereign State
of South Carolina in the role of the mother of the nursery tale who sent her
small boy to the river to bathe, with the admonition that he should hang his
'clothes on a hickory limb, but not go near the water."' Sirrine v. State. 132
S. C. 241, 246, 128 S. E. 172, 174 (1925). See also St. Julian v. State, 82 So.
2d 85, 87 (La. App. 1955); Westerson v. State, 207 "Minn. 412, 416, 291
N. W 900,902 (1940).
138. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 651 (Supp. 1954). In the preamble to
this act, the legislature expressly revealed its purpose was to overcome the
judicial rule of immunity from liability. Okla. Sess. Laws 1953, p. 508.
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as frequently applied' 39 in construing the statutes by which over half
of the states have consented to suit in contract. 140 Where the states
have consented to stit in contract, the courts see no difficulty in
taking jurisdiction of actions against the state even though they
theoretically have no better means of enforcing payment of a money
judgment in contract than they do in tort. In the usual case however,
appropriation of funds is made in the statute conferring power onl tile
officer to enter a contract on behalf of the state, and many states
statutorily provide no state officer may contract ol behalf of the
state unless a prior appropriation has been made."' Where funds
were appropriated, and the officer acted within his authority in entering the contract on behalf of the state, one court has awarded
judgment against the state for contract damages even where there
had been no statutory consent to suit. 142 In the absence of an appropriation however, monetary relief has been refused on the ground it
would diminish funds in the treasury and necessarily involve interests of the state within the protection of soverign immtmnity I"
Where the officer has exceeded his statutory authority to contract, the state is not liable, even where it has consented to suit.'" *
Liability for fraud may be imposed on the officer where lie has
acted maliciously or in bad faith,' although where the officer's
139. But see Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P
2d 397 (1947) (governmental function test applied)
140. 13 states give their courts jurisdiction over contract actions against
the state in the first instance. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, § 439.8B (1955) , Ind. Anil.
Stat. § 4-1501 (Burns Supp. 1955) , Mass. Gen. Laws c. 258, § 1 (1933),
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3548(8) (Supp. 1954) , Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 878,
§ 2, Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 83.601 (Supp. 1955), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-324
(1943) , N. H. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 243, N. Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 9; N. C. Const.
art. IV, § 9, N. D. Rev. Code § 32-1202 (1943) , S. D. Code § 33.0604
(1939) , Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.010 (1951)
8 other states allow appeal to
the courts of administrative claims board decisions in contract. Arz. Code
Anti. § 27-101 (1939) , Cal. Gov. Code Ann. § 16041 (West 1954) , Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 44.020 (Supp. 1954) , Miss. Code Ann. § 4387 (1942), Nev. Coip.

Laws § 9200 (1929) , Va. Code § 8-752 (1950) , Wis. Stat. § 285.01 (1953)

Most of the remaining states have provision for presentation of contract
claims to administrative boards.
141. E.g., Ariz. Code Ann. § 10-923 (Supp. 1951)
142. State Highway Department v. Dawson, 126 Colo. 490, 253 P 2d
593 (1952). The court emphasized the fact that there was ain available fund
from which relief could be granted.
143. See Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Commission, 63 Wyo. 13, 31,
177 P 2d 397, 402 (1947) Moreover, in a case where legislative appropriation was made for an amount less than that claimed by the plaitiff, one
court refused to award additional compensation. See Gallena v. Scott, 11
N. J. 231, 94 A. 2d 312 (1953)
144. Persons dealing with public officers are charged with "notice" of the
limits of the officer's authority to contract. See Williams Oil Co. v. State,
198 Misc. 907, 909, 100 N. Y S. 2d 42. 44 (Ct. Cl. 1950) , State v. Ragland
Clinic-Hospital, 238 Texas 393, 397, 159 S. W 2d 105, 107 (1942)
145. Sims Printing Co. v. Kerby, 56 Ariz. 130, 106 P 2d 197 (1940),
cf. Wilkinson v. Mercer, 125 Minn. 201, 146 N. W 362 (1914) Yet in one
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acts had been in good faith, the Minnesota court early extended
sovereign immunity to the officer on the ground of the difficulty the
state would have in obtaining officers to contract on its behalf,
were they to run the risk of personal liability on contracts in which
they had no personal interest.""
Counterclaimagainst the state for damages
Where action is instigated by the state, and a counter-claim is
made for money damages arising out of the same transaction, the
courts are in direct conflict as to whether the counterclaim is a suit
against the state within the immunity rule.147 Generally where the
amount of the counterclaim is less than that claimed by the state,
and is only pleaded by way of recoupment or in defense to the state's
action, the courts give judgment on the counterclaim,"4 s but where
the counterclaim exceeds the amount sought by the state, most
courts find the counterclaim barred by sovereign immunity.140 At
least one court has allowed a counterclaim in excess of the amount
claimed by the state, reasoning that when the state instituted the
suit, it waived its immunity from all valid defenses, and that the
constitutional provision against withdrawal of funds from the state
treasury would not be violated for the state agency bringing the
suit had departmental funds available from which recovery might
50
be allowed.
There can be little justification for applying sovereign immunity to bar a counterclaim asserted in defense to an action
started by the state, unless the courts condone the use of a different
type of procedure to determine the law when the state is a party to
litigation than is used in suits between ordinary citizens.
case where the breach was malicious, it was classified as a tort and the
officer was protected by sovereign immunity from tort liability. Eyrmg v.

Board of Regents, 277 P. 2d 550 (N.M. 1954).
146. As early as 1860 the Minnesota court stated, "When., . there
is no want of good faith, a party contracts with such an officer with his eyes
open, and has no one to blame if it should afterwrards appear that the officer
had not the authority which it was supposed he had. Vere the rule otherwise.
"
few persons of responsibility would be found willing to serve the public.
Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. (Gill.) *83, *92 (1860).
147. Compare State v. F. W Fitch Co., 236 Iowa 208, 17 N. W 2d 380
(1945), witl State v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W Va. 319, 56 S.E. 2d 549
(1949).
148. State ex rel Comm'rs of Land Office v. Sparks, 208 Okla. 150, 253
P. 2d 1070 (1953) (defensive plea), Commonwealth v. Berks County, 364
Pa. 447, 72 A. 2d 129 (1950) (recoupment). See also State v. Bucholz, 169
Minn. 226, 210 N. W 1006 (1926) (recoupment).
149. State Road Comm'n v. Ball, 138 V Va. 319, 56 S. E. 2d 549
(1949).
150. State v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 XV. Va. 319, 76 S. E. 2d 55 (1953).
This case was limited to situations where separate departmental funds are
available in State RoadComm'n v. Ball, supra note 149.
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The money fiction
Thus in modern times, the doctrine of sovereign immunity will
usually bar an action seeking a money judgment against the state,
or its officers, in the absence of statutory consent. In justification
the courts have usually relied on one of three policy considerations,
that to impose liability on a state officer for acts done in good faith
on behalf of the state would be unjust, that the courts have no
power to enforce money judgments against the state and hence to
assume jurisdiction of an action seeking a money judgment would
be frivolous, or that to impose liability on state funds at the suit of
an individual would create too great a burden on the performance
of governmental functions.
First, in all actions seeking money judgments against the state,
the courts could apply the fiction that an officer violating substantive law is "stripped of his authority" and personally liable. The
result of applying the fiction would be to permit recovery by the
individual citizen, at the personal expense of the officer. The result
of refusing to apply the fiction is to deny the individual a remedy,
and protect states officers from personal liability by the use of
sovereign immunity For the most part, the courts have resolved
the question by extending sovereign immunity to the illegal acts
of state officers on the ground the state would incur considerable
difficulty in obtaining officers to conduct state business were they
required to assume personal liability for acts done on behalf of the
state.
Second, the courts frequently refuse jurisdiction of actions seeking money judgments against the state on the ground they have no
means of enforcing the judgment. If means to enforce the judgment be deemed essential, the courts do in many instances have the
means by which money judgments may be enforced against the
state. Of course judicial process such as garnishment of funds in
state depositories1 51 or levy and execution on state lands 1s 2 has not
been allowed. Yet the basic difficulty in enforcing money judgments
is the constitutional provision found in most states prohibiting withdrawal of funds from the state treasury except by legislative appropriation. 53 However these provisions do not prescribe any particu151. Missouri Tie & Lumber Co. v. Sullivan, 275 Mich. 26, 265 N. W

779 (1936).
152. Cf. El Camino Irrigation Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp., 12 Cal.
2d 378, 85 P 2d 123 (1938).
153. E.g., Minn. Const. art. 9, § 9, art. 4, § 12. The state of Michigan
has overcome the appropriation problem by enactment of a continuing appropriation of funds from the state treasury, to the extent of judgments awarded
by the court of claims. Mich. Comp. Laws § 3.491 (1952).
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Jar form for the legislative appropriation and the courts frequently
find the requisite appropriation in the constitution itself, or in the
,statutory law of the state. For example, one court has granted
mandamus to compel issuance of a warrant on the treasurer in payment of a money judgment on the ground that the eminent domain
statute enacted in pursuance of the constitutional provision requiring just compensation for the taking of'lands, constituted an
appropriation of funds within the requirement of legislative appropriation.154M oreover, annual legislative budgets usually include
an appropriation to state agencies for operating expenses, and one
court has held that an award from departmental funds did not violate the constitutional requirement of a legislative appropriation.ls5
In addition, bookkeeping adjustments have been ordered by the
courts, which in many instances will accomplish the same result as
an award of money compensation.150 Yet where no appropriation is
found, the courts frequently do not have the power to coerce the
payment of money judgments by the state.
Even where judgment cannot be enforced, there is no inherent
reason, other than notions of judicial dignity, why inability to
enforce a judgment should bar adjudication of substantive legal
questions in the regular courts. If a citizen defendant in an ordinary
action for a money judgment were to assert as a defense the court's
inability to enforce ajudgment because of defendant's lack of funds,
the assertion would certainly not forestall the court from taking
jurisdiction, determining the amount of liability, and awarding judgment on the merits even though the court would have no means of
enforcing the judgment. Where the state has consented to suit, the
courts assume jurisdiction even though they have no better means
of enforcing a judgment for money damages under a consent statute
than elsewhere. 157 Where the defense of a lack of appropriation of
funds was raised in an action under a consent statute, the Minnesota court ruled that the fact the method of payment is in legisla154. State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 162 Pac. 1 (1917).
155. State v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W Va. 319, 56 S. E. 2d 549
(1949) ; accord, -American Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 152 Ohio St. 287,
298, 89 N. E. 2d 301, 307 (1949).
156. See Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Call, 221 Ark. 537,
254 S.W 2d 319 (1953) (mandatory injunction granted to compel bookkeeping adjustment).

157. Most consent statutes provide that no execution or levy shall issue
in enforcement of a judgment. E.g., N. D. Rev. Code § 32-1204 (1943). The
statutes of two states, however, provide judgment may be enforced in the

same manner as any other judgment. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 44.140 (1955), N. Y.

Ct CL Act §20 (3).
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tive discretion did not bar jurisdiction to establish liability and
determine the amount thereof."5 s
Thus it would seem that refusal to take jurisdiction of actions
seeking money judgments against the state is in reality a policy
consideration, since lack of means to enforce a judgment need not
bar jurisdiction as a matter of necessity While at times the courts
have suggested that an award of a money judgment against the
state would impose an undue burden on the performance of governmental functions, the courts have not hesitated directly to "burden"
performance of governmental functions by compelling or restraining a transfer of funds within the state treasury at the instance of
taxpayers seeking governmental conformity with the constitution. " '
Implicit in the notion of "burden" on the state, however, is the
assumption that resolving the jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity against the state will always result in a determination of a
money judgment against the state. To the extent that the cases do
impose financial obligation on the state, perhaps the best potential
solution of the "burden" concept lies in the field of insurance. The
state of Idaho has provided for the securing of liability insurance
by the state and by all of its officers and agencies, and has statutorily
consented to suit to the extent of the insurance. 11°
While there may be legitimate policy considerations behind judicial respect for the performance of governmental functions, to decide an action against a state officer is a suit against the state and
barred by sovereign immunity solely on the ground that the plaintiff
seeks a money judgment, can hardly lead to the development of any
consistent application of policy At the very least, it would seem
that judicial protection of a citizen's constitutional guarantees should
not be denied regardless of whether monetary or any other form
of relief is sought.
PART IV

CONCLUSION

Although the harshness of the sovereign immunity concept has
been considerably modified by both legislatures and courts, the concept still permits governmental irresponsibility in many instances.
The modern trend in legislative modification is seemingly toward
158. See Westerson v. State, 207 Minn. 412, 418, 291 N. W 900, 903
(1940). In addition the fact the court cannot oust the state from land is no
reason to deny jurisdiction of an action to quiet title against the state. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. People, 279 App. Div. 85, 88, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 432,
435 (1951), aff'd 304 N. Y. 646. 107 N. E. 2d 509 (1952).
159. See, e.... Mead v. Eagerton. 255 Ala. 66. 50 So. 2d 253 (1951)
160. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 41-3304 through 41-3306 (Supp. 1955) See
also Mont. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 74, p. 125.
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adjudication of actions against the state in the regular courts, but
with precise limitations on the methods by which satisfaction of
money judgments may be obtained. For the most part, the legislatures have been concerned solely with actions seeking money judgments against the state, perhaps assuming other rights will be
effectively protected by the courts.
Frequently the courts have overcome sovereign immunity in
actions seeking specific relief, by use of the fiction that an officer
committing a substantive wrong is "stripped of his authority" and
personally subject to the consequences of his acts. Use of the fiction,
however, has been frequently limited by judicial refusal to grant
relief where the relief sought against statd officers would require
"affirmative" action. Although the opinions are written in terms of
the "affirmative-negative" distinction, the results of the cases indicate that in many instances the distinction may be overcome by the
simple expedient of wording a complaint in the negative terms of
injunction.
Because of a supposed lack of power to enforce a money judgment against the state, the courts have frequently denied actions
seeking such relief on the grounds of sovereign immunity. Yet it
would seem that the courts do not in fact need the power to enforce
a money judgment in order to take jurisdiction of the actions and
adjudicate liability, if any. Thus judicial refusal to entertain actions
seeking money judgments against the state would seem to.be frequently based on an assumption that the legislature will not honor
its legal.obligations.16 ' Yet in every instance found, the legislatures
have appropriated funds in satisfaction of money judgments awarded against the state without any hesitancy whatsoever, and appropriation has usually become a matter of routine. 62 The confusion
resulting from use of the fictions and distinctions peculiar to the
sovereign immunity concept has resulted in many instances in the
determination by administrative officials of questions of substantive
law such as the quieting of title to land, without any judicial review
whatsoever. Because of the "undue burden" concept, the courts have
been forced to rely mostly on the specific remedies, rather than
permitting the performance of governmental functions unhampered
by judicial interference, subject to just compensation for any injury
done.
161. Yet in State v. Bentley, 216 Minn. 146, 151, 12 N. W 2d 347, 353
(1943), the court expressly refused judically to assume that the legislature
would ignore the constitutional requirement of providing payment for the
taking of lands for the public use.
162. See note 73 .supra.
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While further inroads on sovereign immunity are limited by
constitutional provisions in four states, in the remaining states the
legislatures and the courts both have the power and means by which
to abolish sovereign immunity The experience of states which have
consented to suit indicates that abolishment of sovereign immunity
does not result in an uncontrollable flood of litigation. As a result
it is doubtful that the outdated and archaic concept of sovereign
immunity contributes anything of value to the administration of
justice between the states and their citizens in the twentieth century

